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POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS
In the police interrogation room, where, until the second
third of the century, police practices were unscrutinized
and virtually unregulated, constitutional ideals collide
with the grim realities of law enforcement. It is not easy
to talk about the defendant’s right to silence and his RIGHT
TO COUNSEL when the defendant has confessed to a heinous crime—for example, the rape and murder of a small
child as in BREWER V. WILLIAMS (1977) or the kidnapping,

robbery, and murder of a cab driver, by a shotgun blast to
the back of the head, as in RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS (1980)—
and the confession seems quite credible. Thus, for many
years few matters have split the Supreme Court, troubled
the legal profession, and agitated the public as much as
the confession cases.
Not surprisingly, the most famous confession case of all,
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966), is regarded as the high-water
mark of the WARREN COURT’s ‘‘DUE PROCESS revolution.’’ Nor
is it surprising that the decision became the prime target
of those who attributed an increase of crime to the softness of judges. Miranda, which finally applied the RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION to the informal proceedings in
the interrogation room, emerged only after a long struggle, and increasing dissatisfaction, with the test for admitting confessions that preceded it—the ‘‘voluntariness’’
test based on the ‘‘totality of circumstances.’’ Miranda can
be understood only in light of the Court’s prior efforts to
deal with the intractable confession problem.
Until well into the eighteenth century, doctrines concerning confessions did not affect the admissibility of extrajudicial narrative statements of guilt offered as
EVIDENCE, but dealt only with the conditions under which
immediate conviction followed a confession as a plea of
guilty. It was not until The King v. Warickshall (1783) that
an English court clearly expressed the notion that confessions might be unworthy of credit because of the circumstances under which they were obtained. In that case the
judges declared: ‘‘A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to
flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is
admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope,
or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape
when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that
no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.’’
Because a separate rule against coerced confessions
emerged in eighteenth-century English cases nearly a century after the right against self-incrimination had become
established, JOHN H. WIGMORE, the great master of the law
of evidence, concluded that the two rules had no connection. But Leonard W. Levy, the leading student of the origins of the right against self-incrimination, strongly
disagrees. He maintains that ‘‘[t]he relationship between
torture, compulsory self-incrimination, and coerced confessions was an historical fact as well as a physical and
psychological one’’ and that ‘‘in the 16th and 17th centuries, the argument against the three, resulting in the rules
that Wigmore said had no connection, overlapped’’ (Levy
1968, pp. 265, 288–289 n.102).
Levy points out that Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, in his Law
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of Evidence, ‘‘written before 1726 though not published
until thirty years later, stated that though the best evidence of guilt was a confession, ‘this confession must be
voluntary and without compulsion; for our Law in this differs from the Civil Law, that it will not force any Man to
accuse himself; and in this we do certainly follow the Law
of Nature, which commands every Man to endeavor his
own Preservation . . .’ ’’ (Levy 1968, p. 327). Baron Gilbert’s phrasing, ‘‘our Law . . . will not force any Man to
accuse himself,’’ Levy says, ‘‘expressed the traditional English formulation of the right against self-incrimination, or
rather against compulsory self-incrimination. The element
of compulsion or involuntariness was always an essential
ingredient of the right and, before the right existed, of
protests against incriminating interrogations’’ (ibid., pp.
327–328).
Although Levy insists that this was a historical blunder,
both in the United States and in England the confession
rules and the right against self-incrimination were divorced and, with the one notable exception of Bram v.
United States (1897), went their separate ways—until the
two rules were intertwined in MALLOY V. HOGAN (1964) and
fused in the famous Miranda case (1966). Moreover, for
most of its life the voluntariness test was essentially an
alternative statement of the rule that a confession was entitled to credit so long as it was free of influence that made
it untrustworthy or ‘‘probably untrue.’’ Wigmore reflected
the law prevailing at the time when in 1940 he pointed
out that a confession was not inadmissible because of ‘‘any
breach of confidence’’ or ‘‘any illegality in the method of
obtaining it,’’ or ‘‘because of any connection with the privilege against self-incrimination.‘‘
In Bram v. United States (1897) the Supreme Court did
rely explicitly on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment in holding a confession inadmissible. But the
Court soon abandoned the Bram approach, perhaps stung
by the criticism of Wigmore and others that it had misread
history, and until the mid-1960s Bram amounted only to
an early excursion from the prevailing due processvoluntariness test.
The right against self-incrimination was not deemed
applicable to the states until 1964, and by that time the
Supreme Court had decided more than thirty state confession cases. Moreover, even if the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination had been deemed applicable to the states much earlier, the law pertaining to ‘‘coerced’’ or ‘‘involuntary’’ confessions still would have
developed without it. For until Miranda (1966), the prevailing view was that the suspect in the police interrogation room was not being compelled to be a witness against
himself within the meaning of the privilege; he was threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely nor con-
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tempt for refusing to testify at all. Because the police have
no legal authority to compel statements, there is no legal
obligation to answer, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply.
So long as police interrogators were not required to
advise suspects of their rights nor to permit them to consult with lawyers who would do so, there could be little
doubt that many a suspect would assume that the police
had a legal right to an answer. Still worse, there could be
little doubt that many a suspect would assume, or be led
to believe, that there were extralegal sanctions for refusing
to cooperate. Small wonder that commentators decried
the legal reasoning that excluded the privilege against selfincrimination from the stationhouse for so many years as
‘‘casuistic,’’ ‘‘a quibble,’’ and a triumph of logic over life.
Wigmore long condemned the statement of the confession rule in terms of voluntariness for the reason that
‘‘the fundamental question for confessions is whether
there is any danger that they may be untrue . . . and that
there is nothing in the mere circumstance of compulsion
to speak in general . . . which creates any risk of untruth.’’
But only two years after the Supreme Court handed down
its first FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT due process cases, BROWN
V. MISSISSIPPI (1936), Charles McCormick defended the
voluntariness terminology on the ground that it might reflect a recognition that the confession rule not only protects against the danger of untrustworthiness but also
protects an interest closely akin to that protected by the
right against compulsory self-incrimination. Three decades later, the Miranda Court would agree. McCormick
also suggested that the entire course of decisions in the
confessions field could best be understood as ‘‘an application to confessions both of a privilege against evidence
illegally obtained . . . and of an overlapping rule of incompetency which excludes the confessions when untrustworthy’’ (1954, p. 157). In the advanced stages of the
voluntariness test, the Court would again make plain its
agreement with McCormick.
Thus, in Spano v. New York (1959) the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice EARL WARREN, pointed out that the
ban against involuntary confessions turns not only on their
unreliability but also on the notion that ‘‘the police must
obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves.’’ And the following year,
in Blackburn v. Alabama (1960), the Court, again speaking
through Chief Justice Warren, recognized that ‘‘a complex
of values underlies the stricture against use by the state
of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this
Court terms involuntary.’’
The ‘‘untrustworthiness’’ rationale, the view that the
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rules governing the admissibility of confessions were
merely a system of safeguards against false confessions,
could explain the exclusion of the confession in Brown v.
Mississippi (1936), where the deputy sheriff who had presided over the beatings of the defendants conceded that
one had been whipped, ‘‘but not too much for a Negro.’’
And the untrustworthiness rationale was also adequate to
explain the exclusion of confessions in the cases that immediately followed the Brown case such as CHAMBERS V.
FLORIDA (1940), Canty v. Alabama (1940), White v. Texas
(1940), and Ward v. Texas (1942), for they, too, involved
actual or threatened physical violence.
As the crude practices of the early cases became outmoded and cases involving more subtle pressures began
to appear, however, it became more difficult to assume
that the resulting confessions were untrustworthy. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944), for example, although the confession was obtained after some thirty-six hours of almost
continuous interrogation, there was good reason to think
that the defendant had indeed been involved in the murder. The man whom the defendant named as his wife’s
killer readily admitted his involvement and accused the
defendant of hiring him to do the job. Moreover, after the
interrogation had ceased and the defendant had been examined by his family physician, he made what the doctor
described as an ‘‘entirely voluntary’’ confession, in the
course of which he explained why he wanted his wife
killed. Nevertheless, calling the extended questioning ‘‘inherently coercive,’’ a 6–3 majority, speaking through
Justice HUGO L. BLACK, held that Ashcraft’s confession
should not have been allowed into evidence. Under the
circumstances, the Ashcraft case seemed to reflect less
concern with the reliability of the confession than disapproval of police methods which appeared to the Court to
be dangerous and subject to serious abuse.
Although he dissented in Ashcraft, Justice FELIX FRANKFURTER soon became the leading exponent of the ‘‘police
misconduct’’ or ‘‘police methods’’ rationale for barring the
use of confessions. According to this rationale, in order to
condemn and deter abusive, offensive, or otherwise objectionable police interrogation methods, it was necessary
to exclude confessions produced by such methods regardless of how relevant and credible they might be, a point
underscored in ROGERS V. RICHMOND (1961). After more
conventional methods had failed to produce any incriminating statements, a police chief pretended to order petitioner’s ailing wife brought down to headquarters for
questioning. Petitioner promptly confessed to the murder
for which he was later convicted. The trial judge found
that the police chief’s pretense had ‘‘no tendency to produce a confession that was not in accord with the truth’’
and in his charge to the jury he indicated that the admissibility of the confession should turn on its probable reli-

ability. But the Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, held that convictions based on involuntary confessions must fall
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but
because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law;
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system. . . . Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to
reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions
obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the
defendant had confessed. Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally
impermissible methods in their inducement. . . . The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for
purpose of the Federal Constitution, on the question
whether the [police behavior] was such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confessions not
freely self-determined—a question to be answered with
complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact
spoke the truth.

The ‘‘voluntariness’’ test seemed to be at once too wide
and too narrow. In the sense of wanting to confess, or
doing so in a completely spontaneous manner, as one
might confess to rid one’s soul of guilt, no confession reviewed by the Court under the ‘‘voluntariness’’ test had
been voluntary. On the other hand, in the sense that the
situation always presented a choice between two alternatives, all confessions examined by the Court had been voluntary.
As the voluntariness test evolved, it became increasingly clear that terms such as ‘‘voluntariness’’ and ‘‘coercion’’ were not being used as tools of analysis, but as mere
conclusions. When a court concluded that the police had
resorted to unacceptable interrogation techniques, it
called the resulting confession ‘‘involuntary’’ and talked of
‘‘overbearing the will.’’ When, on the other hand, a court
concluded that the methods the police had employed were
permissible, it called the resulting confession ‘‘voluntary’’
and talked of ‘‘self-determination.’’ Moreover, such terms
as ‘‘voluntariness,’’ ‘‘coercion,’’ and ‘‘overbearing the will’’
focused directly on neither of the two underlying reasons
that led the courts to bar the use of confessions—the offensiveness of police interrogation methods or the risk
that these methods had produced an untrue confession.
Another problem with the due process ‘‘totality of the
circumstances’’—voluntariness test was that it was amorphous, elusive, and largely unmanageable. Almost everything was relevant—for example, whether the suspect was
advised of his rights; whether he was held incommunicado; the suspect’s age, intelligence, education, and prior
criminal record; the conditions and duration of his deten-
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tion—but almost nothing was decisive. Except for direct
physical coercion no single factor or combination of them
guaranteed exclusion of a confession as involuntary. Because there were so many variables in the voluntariness
equation that one determination seldom served as a useful
precedent for another, the test offered police interrogators
and trial courts little guidance. Trial courts were encouraged to indulge their subjective preferences, and appellate courts were discouraged from active review.
In the thirty years between Brown (1936) and Miranda
(1966) the Court had reviewed about one state confession
case per year and two-thirds of these had been death penalty cases. Indeed, the Court’s workload had been so great
that it had even denied a hearing in most death penalty
cases. Not surprisingly, Justice Black remarked in the
course of the oral argument in Miranda: ‘‘If you are going
to determine [the admissibility of the confession] each
time on the circumstances, [if] this Court will take them
one by one, [it] is more than we are capable of doing.’’
The Supreme Court’s dissatisfaction with the elusive
‘‘voluntariness’’ test and its quest for a more concrete and
manageable standard led to the decisions in MASSIAH V.
UNITED STATES (1964) and ESCOBEDO V. ILLINOIS (1964) and
culminated in the 1966 Miranda decision.
Massiah grew out of the following facts: After he had
been indicted for various federal narcotics violations and
retained a lawyer, and while he was out on bail, Massiah
was invited by his codefendant, Colson, to discuss the
pending case in Colson’s car. Massiah assumed that he was
talking to a partner in crime, but Colson had become a
secret government agent. A radio transmitter had been
concealed in Colson’s car to enable a nearby federal agent
to overhear the Massiah-Colson conversation. As expected, Massiah made incriminating statements.
Despite the fact that Massiah was neither in ‘‘custody’’
nor subjected to ‘‘police interrogation,’’ as that term is normally used, the Supreme Court held that his damaging
admissions should have been excluded from evidence. The
decisive feature of the case was that after adversary criminal proceedings had been initiated against him—and
Massiah’s RIGHT TO COUNSEL had ‘‘attached’’—government
agents had deliberately elicited statements from him in
the absence of counsel.
Massiah was soon overshadowed by Escobedo, decided
a short five weeks later. When Danny Escobedo had been
arrested for murder he had repeatedly but unsuccessfully
asked to speak to his lawyer. Instead, the police induced
Escobedo to implicate himself in the murder. Although
Escobedo had incriminated himself before he had been
indicted or adversary criminal proceedings had otherwise
commenced against him, a 5–4 majority held that under
the circumstances ‘‘it would exalt form over substance to
make the right to counsel . . . depend on whether at the
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time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a
formal indictment.’’ At the time the police had questioned
him, Escobedo ‘‘had become the accused and the purpose
of the investigation was to ‘‘get him’ to confess his guilt
despite his constitutional right not to do so.’’
Until Miranda moved the case off center-stage two
years later, the meaning and scope of Escobedo was a matter of widespread disagreement. In large part this was due
to the accordion-like quality of Justice ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG’s majority opinion. At some places the opinion suggested that a suspect’s right to counsel was triggered once
the investigation ceased to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and began to ‘‘focus’’ on him, regardless
of whether he was in ‘‘custody’’ or asked for a lawyer. Elsewhere, however, the opinion seemed to limit the holding
to its special facts (Escobedo had specifically requested
and been denied an opportunity to seek his lawyer’s advice, the police had failed to warn him of his right to remain silent, and he was in police custody).
The Escobedo dissenters read the majority opinion
broadly: ‘‘The right to counsel now not only entitles the
accused the counsel’s advice and aid in preparing for trial
but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation
once the accused has become suspect. From that very moment apparently his right to counsel attaches.’’ The dissenters expressed a preference for a self-incrimination
approach, rather than a right to counsel approach. The
right against self-incrimination, after all, proscribed only
compelled statements. ‘‘It is incongruous to assume,’’ they
argued, ‘‘that the provision for counsel in the Sixth
Amendment was meant to amend or supersede the selfincrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment, which is
now applicable to the States.’’ Two years later, in Miranda,
the Court would focus on the Fifth Amendment, but it
would define ‘‘compulsion’’ within the meaning of the
privilege in a way that displeased the four Escobedo dissenters (all of whom also dissented in Miranda).
Dissenting in Ashcraft in 1944, Justice ROBERT H. JACKSON agreed that custody and questioning of a suspect for
thirty-six hours is ‘‘inherently coercive,’’ but quickly
added: ‘‘And so is custody and examination for one hour.
Arrest itself is inherently coercive and so is detention. . . .
But does the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions
made after arrest because questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is ‘‘inherently coercive’?’’ Both Jackson
and Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in Ashcraft, knew that in 1944 the Court was not ready for an
affirmative answer to Jackson’s question. But by 1966 the
Court had grown ready.
Ernesto Miranda had been arrested for rape and kidnapping, taken to a police station, and placed in an ‘‘interrogation room,’’ where he was questioned about the
crimes. Two hours later the police emerged from the room
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with a signed confession. In the 1940s or 1950s Miranda’s
confession unquestionably would have been admissible
under the voluntariness test; his questioning had been
mild compared to the objectionable police methods that
had rendered a resulting confession involuntary in past
cases.
The Supreme Court, however, had become increasingly
dissatisfied with the voluntariness test. Miranda’s interrogators admitted that neither before nor during the questioning had they advised him of his right to remain silent
or his right to consult with an attorney before answering
questions or his right to have an attorney present during
the interrogation. These failures were to prove fatal for
the prosecution.
In Miranda a 5–4 majority, speaking through Chief
Justice Warren, concluded at last that ‘‘all the principles
embodied in the privilege [against self-incrimination] apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement
officers during in-custody questioning.’’ Observed the
Court:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected
to the persuasions [described in various interrogation
manuals, from which the Court quoted at length] cannot
be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater than in courts or
other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. . . .
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice.

The adequate protective devices necessary to neutralize the compulsion inherent in the interrogation environment are the now familiar ‘‘Miranda warnings.’’ Although
Miranda is grounded primarily in the right against selfincrimination, it also has a right to counsel component
designed to protect and to reinforce the right to remain
silent. Thus, prior to any questioning a person taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way must not only be warned that he has a
right to remain silent and that ‘‘anything said can and will
be used against [him],’’ but must also be told of his right
to counsel, either retained or appointed. ‘‘[T]he need for
counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege,’’ stated
the Court, ‘‘comprehends not merely a right to consult
with counsel prior to any questioning but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant
so desires.’’
A suspect, of course, may waive his rights, provided he
does so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. But no
valid WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS can be recognized

unless specifically made after the warnings have been
given. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he mere fact that [a person] may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements . . . does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he had consulted with
an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.’’
Although a great hue and cry greeted the case, Miranda
may fairly be viewed as a compromise between the old
voluntariness test (a standard so elusive and unmanageable that its safeguards were largely illusory) and extreme
proposals (based on an expansive reading of Escobedo)
that threatened to ‘‘kill’’ confessions.
Miranda allows the police to conduct general on-thescene questioning even though the person arrested is both
uninformed and unaware of his rights. It allows the police
to question a person in his home or office, provided they
do not restrict the person’s freedom to terminate the
meeting. (Indeed, the opinion seems to recommend that
the police question a suspect in his home or place of business.) Moreover, ‘‘custody’’ alone does not call for the Miranda warnings. The Court might have held that the
inherent pressures and anxieties produced by arrest and
detention are substantial enough to require neutralizing
warnings. But it did not. Thus, so long as the police do not
question one who has been brought to the station house,
Miranda leaves them free to hear and act upon volunteered statements, even though the volunteer neither
knows nor is advised of his rights. (This point was recognized by dissenting Justice BYRON R. WHITE in Miranda.)
Surprisingly, Miranda does not strip police interrogation of its characteristic secrecy. To the extent that any
lawyer worth his salt will tell a suspect to remain silent it
is no less clear that any officer worth his salt will be sorely
tempted to get the suspect to do just the opposite. But no
stenographic transcript (let alone an electronic recording)
of the waiver transaction, or the questioning that follows
a waiver, need be made; no disinterested observer (let
alone a judicial officer) need be present. There is language
in Miranda suggesting that the police must make an objective record of the waiver transaction but this language
has been largely overlooked or disregarded by the lower
courts. And nowhere in the Miranda opinion does the
court explicitly require the police to make either tape or
verbatim stenographic recordings of the crucial events.
On the eve of Miranda, there were doubts that law enforcement could survive if the Court were to project defense counsel into the police station. But the Miranda
Court did so only in a quite limited way. It never took the
final step (and, as a practical matter, the most significant
one) of requiring that the suspect first consult with a lawyer, or actually have a lawyer present, in order for his
waiver of constitutional rights to be considered valid.
Whether suspects are continuing to confess because
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they do not fully grasp the meaning of the Miranda warnings or because the police are mumbling, hedging, or undermining the warnings, or whether the promptings of
conscience and the desire ‘‘to get it over with’’ are indeed
overriding the impact of the warnings, or whether admissions of guilt are quid pro quos for reduced charges or
lighter sentences, it is plain that in-custody suspects are
continuing to confess with great frequency. This result
would hardly have ensued if Miranda had fully projected
counsel into the interrogation process, requiring the advice or presence of counsel before a suspect could waive
his rights.
Because Miranda was the centerpiece of the Warren
Court’s revolution in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and one of the
leading issues of the 1968 presidential campaign, almost
everyone expected the BURGER COURT to treat Miranda unkindly. And it did, but only for a decade.
The first blow was struck in HARRIS V. NEW YORK (1971),
which held that statements preceded by defective Miranda warnings, and thus inadmissible to establish the
prosecution’s initial case, could nevertheless be used to
impeach the defendant’s credibility if he took the stand.
The Court noted, but seemed untroubled, that some comments in the landmark opinion seemed to bar the use of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda for any purpose.
A second impeachment case, Oregon v. Hass (1975),
seemed to inflict a deeper wound. In Hass, the police advised the suspect of his rights and he asserted them. Nevertheless, the police refused to honor the suspect’s request
for a lawyer and continued to question him. That such a
flagrant violation of Miranda should produce evidence
that may be used for impeachment purposes is especially
troublesome; under these circumstances, unlike those in
Harris, it is fair to assume that no hope of obtaining evidence usable for the government’s case-in-chief operates
to induce the police to comply with Miranda. Hass, then,
was a more harmful blow to Miranda that was Harris.
Even more disturbing than the impeachment cases is
their recent extension to permit the use of a defendant’s
prior silence to impeach his credibility if he chooses to
testify at his trial. In JENKINS V. ANDERSON (1980) the Court
held that a murder defendant’s testimony that he had
acted in self-defense could be impeached by showing that
he did not go to the authorities and report his involvement
in the stabbing. In Fletcher v. Weir (1982) the Court held
that even a defendant’s post-arrest silence—so long as he
was not given and need not have been given the Miranda
warnings—could be used to impeach him if he decided
to testify at trial.
Still other blows were struck by Michigan v. Mosley
(1975) and Oregon v. Mathiason (1977). Although language in Miranda can be read as establishing a per se rule
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against any further questioning of one who had asserted
his right to silence, Mosley held that under certain circumstances, which the case left unclear, if the police cease
questioning on the spot, they may try again and succeed
at a later interrogation session. Mathiason, a formalistic,
crabbed reading of Miranda, demonstrates that even police station interrogation is not necessarily ‘‘custodial.’’
(The suspect had agreed to meet a police officer in the
state patrol office and had come to the office alone.)
For supporters of Miranda, the most ominous note of
all was struck by Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, speaking
for the Court in Michigan v. Tucker (1974). The Tucker
Court viewed the Miranda warnings as ‘‘not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution’’ but only ‘‘prophylactic standards’’ designed to ‘‘safeguard’’ or to ‘‘provide
practical reinforcement’’ for the right against selfincrimination. And it seemed to equate ‘‘compulsion’’
within the meaning of that right with ‘‘coercion’’ or ‘‘involuntariness’’ under the pre-Miranda due process test. It
seemed to miss the point that much greater pressures
were necessary to render a confession ‘‘involuntary’’ under
the old test than are needed to make a statement ‘‘compelled’’ under the new. That was one of the principal reasons the old test was abandoned in favor of Miranda.
A lumping together of self-incrimination ‘‘compulsion’’
and pre-Miranda ‘‘involuntariness,’’ which appears to be
what the Court did in Tucker, seemed to approach a rejection of the central premises of Miranda. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state criminal justice. By stripping Miranda of its most apparent
constitutional basis without explaining what other bases
for it there might be, the Court in the Tucker opinion
seemed to be preparing the way for the eventual overruling of Miranda.
A decade later, in NEW YORK V. QUARLES (1984) and in
OREGON V. ELSTAD (1985), a majority of the Court, relying
heavily on language in the Tucker opinion, again drew a
distinction between statements that are actually ‘‘coerced’’
or ‘‘compelled’’ and those that are obtained merely in violation of Miranda’s ‘‘procedural safeguards’’ or ‘‘prophylactic rules.’’ Quarles admitted a statement a handcuffed
rape suspect had made when questioned by police about
the whereabouts of a gun he had earlier been reported to
be carrying. The Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, ‘‘conclude[d] that the need for answers to questions
in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting [the] privilege against self-incrimination.’’ Elstad held that the failure to give Miranda warnings to a suspect who made an
incriminating statement when subjected to custodial interrogation in his own home did not bar the use of a subsequent station house confession by the suspect when the
second confession was immediately preceded by Miranda
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warnings. The court, speaking through Justice SANDRA DAY
O’CONNOR, rejected the argument that a Miranda violation
‘‘necessarily breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered following an unwarned statement must be
suppressed as ‘‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’’ Although
Quarles and Elstad can be read very narrowly, and Tucker,
too, can be limited to its special facts, the Court’s language
in these cases—language that ‘‘deconstitutionalizes’’ Miranda—may prove to be far more significant than the
cases’ specific holdings.
In light of the Tucker majority’s undermining of the basis
for Miranda and against the background of such cases as
Harris, Hass, and Mathiason, a 1980 confession case, Rhode
Island v. Innis, posed grave dangers for Miranda. The defendant had been convicted of heinous crimes: kidnapping,
robbery, and murder. He had made incriminating statements while being driven to a nearby police station, only a
few minutes after being placed in the police vehicle. Any
interrogation that might have occurred in the vehicle was
brief and mild—much more so than the direct, persistent
police station interrogation in Miranda and its companion
cases. Two police officers conversing with one another in
the front of the car, but in Innis’s presence, had expressed
concern that because the murder occurred in the vicinity
of a school for handicapped children, one of the children
might find the missing shotgun and injure himself. At this
point, Innis had interrupted the officers and offered to lead
them where the shotgun was hidden.
The Court might have taken an approach suggested by
earlier dissents and limited Miranda to custodial station
house interrogation or its equivalent (for example, a fivehour trip in a police vehicle). It did not do so. The Court
might have taken a mechanical approach to interrogation
and limited it, as some lower courts had, to situations where
the police directly address a suspect. Again, it did not do
so. It might have limited interrogation to situations where
the record establishes (as it did not in Innis) that the police
intended to elicit an incriminating response, an obviously
difficult test to administer. It did not do this either.
Instead, the Court, speaking through Justice POTTER
STEWART (one of the Miranda dissenters), held that ‘‘Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.’’ The term ‘‘interrogation’’ includes
‘‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit as incriminating response from the suspect.’’ Although the Innis case involved police ‘‘speech,’’ the Court’s definition
embraces police tactics that do not. Thus, the Court seems
to have repudiated the position taken by a number of
lower courts that confronting a suspect with physical evi-

dence or with an accomplice who has already confessed is
not interrogation because it does entail verbal conduct on
the part of the police.
One may quarrel, as the three dissenters did, with the
Court’s application of its definition of ‘‘interrogation’’ to
the Innis facts (the Court concluded that the defendant
had not been interrogated). But Innis ia a harder case than
most because there was ‘‘a basis for concluding that the
officer’s remarks were for some purpose other than that of
obtaining evidence from the suspect. An objective listener
could plausibly conclude that the policeman’s remarks . . .
were made solely to express their genuine concern about
the danger posed by the hidden shotgun’’ and thus not
view their conversation ‘‘as a demand for information’’
(White 1980, pp. 1234–1235).
In any event, considering the various ways in which the
Innis Court might have given Miranda a grudging interpretation, its generous definition of ‘‘interrogation’’ seems
much more significant than its questionable application of
the definition to the particular facts of the case. In Innis
the process of qualifying, limiting, and shrinking Miranda
came to a halt. Indeed, it seems fair to say that in Miranda’s hour of peril the Innis Court rose to its defense.
If Innis encouraged Miranda’s defenders, EDWARDS V.
ARIZONA (1981) gladdened them even more. For Edwards
was the first clear-cut victory for Miranda in the Burger
Court. Sharply distinguishing the Mosley case, which had
dealt with a suspect’s assertion of his right to remain silent,
the Edwards Court, speaking through Justice White (another of the Miranda dissenters), held that when a suspect
invokes his right to counsel the police cannot try again.
Under these circumstances, a valid waiver of the right to
counsel cannot be established by showing ‘‘only that [the
suspect] responded further to police-initiated custodial
interrogation,’’ even though he was again advised of his
rights at a second interrogation session. He cannot be
questioned anew ‘‘until counsel has been made available
to him, unless [he] himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police.’’ Thus,
Edwards reinvigorates Miranda in an important respect.
(But a more recent case, Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), interprets ‘‘initiation of further communication’’ so broadly
that it seems to sap Edwards of much of its vitality.)
Although Miranda maintained the momentum generated by Escobedo, it represented a significantly different
approach to the confession problem. Although the Miranda Court understandably tried to preserve some continuity with the loose, groping Escobedo opinion, it has
become increasingly clear that, by shifting from a right to
counsel base to a self-incrimination base, Miranda actually
marked a fresh start in describing the circumstances under
which Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections attach. Escobedo assigned primary significance to the amount of
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guilt available to the police at the time of questioning; the
opinion therefore contains much talk about ‘‘focal point’’
and the ‘‘accusatory stage.’’ But Miranda attaches primary
significance to the conditions surrounding or inherent in
the interrogation setting; thus the opinion contains much
discussion of the ‘‘interrogation environment’’ or the
‘‘police-dominated’’ atmosphere that ‘‘carries its own
badge of intimidation.’’
If the requisite inherent pressures exist, Miranda applies whether or not the individual being questioned is a
‘‘prime suspect’’ or has become ‘‘the accused.’’ On the
other hand, if these pressures are not operating, an individual is not entitled to the Miranda warnings—no matter
how sharply the police have focused on him or how much
they consider him the ‘‘prime suspect’’ or ‘‘the accused.’’
In short, Miranda did not enlarge Escobedo so much as
displace it.
The same, however, cannot be said for Massiah. Although Miranda has dominated the confessions scene ever
since it was handed down, Massiah has emerged as the
other major Warren Court confession doctrine. As
strengthened by two Burger Court decisions, Brewer v.
William (1977) (often called ‘‘the Christian burial speech’’
case) and United States v. Henry (1980), the Massiah doctrine holds that once ‘‘adversary’’ or ‘‘judicial’’ proceedings
have commenced against an individual (by way of INFORMATION, or initial appearance before a magistrate), deliberate government efforts to elicit incriminating statements
from him, whether done openly by uniformed police officers (as in Williams) or surreptitiously by secret government agents (as in Massiah and Henry) violate the
individual’s right to counsel.
Williams revivified Massiah. Indeed, one might even
say that Williams disinterred it. For until the decision in
Williams there was good reason to think that Massiah had
only been a steppingstone to Escobedo and that both cases
had been largely displaced by Miranda.
But Massiah is alive and well. And the policies underlying the Massiah doctrine are quite distinct from those
underlying Miranda. The Massiah doctrine represents a
pure right to counsel approach. It comes into play regardless of whether a person is in custody or is being subjected
to interrogation in the Miranda sense. There need not be
any compelling influences at work, inherent, informal, or
otherwise.
The most recent Massiah case, United States v. Henry
(1980), applied Massiah to a situation where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had instructed its secret
agent, ostensibly a fellow prisoner, not to question the defendant about the crime and there was no showing that
he had. Nevertheless, the defendant’s incriminating statements were held inadmissible. It sufficed that the government had ‘‘intentionally create[d] a situation likely to
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induce [the defendant] to make incriminating statements
without the assistance of counsel.’’ The FBI created such
a situation when it instructed its secret agent to be alert
to any statements made by the defendant, who was housed
in the same cellblock. Even if the agent’s claim were accepted that he did not intend to take affirmative steps to
obtain incriminating statements, the agent ‘‘must have
known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result.’’ Henry not only reaffirmed the Massiah doctrine but
significantly expanded it. Thus, the Massiah doctrine has
emerged as a much more potent force than it ever had
been during the Warren Court era.
The Burger Court’s generous reading of Miranda in Innis and Edwards and its even more generous reading of
Massiah in the Henry case have reaffirmed the Court’s
commitment to control police efforts to obtain confessions
by constitutional rules that transcend ‘‘untrustworthiness’
and ‘‘voluntariness.’’
Regardless of its shortcomings and the hopes it never
fulfilled (or the fears about the case that proved unfounded), Miranda was an understandable and longoverdue effort—and the Court’s most ambitious effort
ever—to solve the police interrogation-confession problem. At the very least it formally recognized an interrogated suspect’s self-incrimination privilege, and a right to
counsel for rich and poor alike designed to protect and
effectuate that privilege; generated a much greater general awareness of procedural rights; and emphatically reminded the police that they neither create the rules of
interrogation nor act free of JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Miranda was an attempt to do in the confessions area
what the Warren Court had done elsewhere—take the nation’s ideals down from the walls, where they had been
kept framed to be pointed at with pride on ceremonial
occasions, and live up to them. The degree to which Miranda actually succeeded is debatable, but the symbolic
quality of the decision extends far beyond its actual impact
upon police interrogation methods.
YALE KAMISAR
(1986)
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